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A backwater to the mainstream of world politics, the Eastern Interior
Provinces of New Spain l (Coahuila, Nuevo Leon, Nuevo Santander, and
Texas) nevertheless felt the impact of the French Revolution and the
period of wars and intrigue that followed. Spanish officials in these prov-
inces--commandants-general, governors, and army officers-for the most
part were loyal adherents to the centuries-old royal tradition, and were
determined to stop the spread of the doctrines of liberty, equality, and fra-
ternity. Even before this period, in fact, they were suspicious and fearful
of foreigners and foreign ideas. Their suspicion stemmed from provincial-
ism, religious nationalism, and past events. Their fear was grounded in
military weakness: the number of Spaniards in these provinces was few,
especially in Texas, compared to the tens of thousands of fickle savages
surrounding them. Therefore, following the outbreak of war in Europe in
early 1793, these officials redoubled their efforts to keep foreign agents
away from the Indians, as well as to keep foreign ideas away from their
own people.
In the fall of 1793 when official confirmation arrived that Spain had
joined with England and other European nations in a war against France,
there was an immediate increase in tensions in the Eastern Interior Prov-
inces. From Chihuahua City Commandant-General Pedro de Nava2 in
November sent instructions to Governor Manuel Mui'ioz of Texas3 to dis-
patch an armed expedition to the Gulf Coast area. The leader of this
party was to exhort the Indians not to treat with any French landing
party, and he was to promise rich rewards to the chiefs if they would relay
quickly the news of any French activities to Spanish officials.' When ru-
mors reached San Antonio a few months later that French agents were
working among the tribes of North Texas, Nava likewise ordered an ex-
pedition to that region. 5
Viceroy Miguel de ]a Grua Talamanca y Brancif0rte (1794-1798) was
not content that sufficient precautions had been taken in Nava's area of
command. In December he ordered that all Frenchmen in the Eastern
Interior Provinces be arrested and confined. However, Texas was ex-
empted from the provisions of this decree because of the large number of
Louisiana-born French living there.6 Such practices ceased in July of
the following year when word arrived from Europe that peace had been re-
established with France.7
Nevertheless, Spanish officials remained zealous in their efforts to pre-
vent the entry into the area of French revolutionary doctrines in the form
of printed matter. As quickly as such works b€came known, they were
banned by the government and placed on the church list of proscribed
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works. For example, in November of 1794 Nava ordered the governors
under his command to seize an copies of The Disenchantment of Man, a
work printed in Spanish in Philadelphia. An copies of the book were to
be confiscated, and an persons arrested who possessed it or had read iU
In October of the fonowing year came a similar order regarding a manu-
script entitled, "Discourse pronounced by Boisi d'Anglas, Member of the
Public Ordel". ..." Nava concluded his dispatch with the prophetic
vlOrds: "Exercise care about the types of material in circulation, for by
this manner our religion, king, state, cult, vassalage, and security may
be lost."9
The war with France was hardly ended before another source of worry
arose to replace it. In October of 1796 N ava informed his governors that
the English were counterfeiting Spanish pesos at Birmingham, England.
with the intention of introducing them into the New World to wreck the
Lconomy in the colonies.10 Within four months came word that war had
been declared against England;" and with this news there was a wave of
fear, amounting almost to hysteria, that the English and Americans were
planning a joint invasion of Louisiana, and possibly Texas. Governor
Munoz wrote his superior that he had taken an possible precautions to
meet the threat: frequent inspections of the coast had been ordered, and
ciligent efforts were being made to keep enemy agents from going among
the Indians.12
The fear that the United States might invade the Eastern Interior
Provinces was not new in 1797. In fact, such a feeling had been growing
since the signing three years earlier of the treaty between the United
States and England (Jay's Treaty). To the Spaniards this accord seemed
a prelude to aggression. And as in the case of the French, there soon
were rumors that American agents were circulating among the Indian
tribes in Texas.13
On July 30, 1795, Nava wrote Governor Munoz of Texas that "the king
has been informed on good authority that the United States has ordered
emissaries to move here [the Interior Provinces] and work to subvert the
population." He noted that dispatches from the Baron de Carondolet,
Governor of Louisiana, told of "greedy persons from the western states"
moving into the intel'iol' of that province. He concluded with a warning to
"exercise care to see that no foreigners go among the Indian nations that
are OUI' anies."l1 Even news of the signing of a treaty between Spain
and the United States (Pinckney's Treaty) did not allay suspicions of
American aggl'ession in the Interior Provinces,15
Despite the fact that no invasion ever materialized and no enemy
agents were caught, the tension continued to mvunt among Spanish offi-
cials. As France and Spain had anied in the European struggle, and as an
undeclared naval war was raging between France and the United States
in the late 1790's, the commanding-general feared that Americans might at-
tempt a sudden seizure of Spanish territory. Especiany alarming to this
official was the granting by Congress of authority for President John
Adams to raise an army of ten thousand men. In August of 1798 Nava
wrote Munoz, " ... some feel that [the Americans] shortly will declare
hostilities with us, In view of this, you are to take all precautions to put
,
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the province under your command in a good state of defellse."16 Two
months later he wrote that the quarrel between the United States and
France made "an outbreak of war almost inevitable."17
The victim of this Spanish fear of the United States was Philip Nolan.
This enigmatic figure first came to Texas as early as 1785, professing
to be a horse trader.IS In 1794-1795 he made another trip to the province,
visiting at San Antonio and La Bahia (present Goliad) to purchase horses
for the Spanish governor .of Louisiana.19 In the fall of 1797 Nolan re-
turned, this time with permission to travel to Nuevo Santander on a pass-
port signed by Commandant-General Nava.20 Before this trip was com-
pleted, however, Nolan's fall from favor had begun. Nava revoked Nolan's
permit to import two thousand pesos worth of goods to be used as presents
for friendly Indians, giving "good reasons" as the grounds for his ac-
tion.21 When the horse trader remained in Texas an additional year for
vague reasons, the commandant-general became very suspicious. In April
of 1799 Nava wrote the governor of Texas: "Tell me if in YO\lr opinion he
has made himself suspect; but, in truth, to me his residing here so long
has not seemed good when less time would have been sufficient to gather
the horses I permitted...."22
Munoz answered the request for information by stating: "In examining
[Nolan's] conduct, I find that he never did anything suspicious. . .. Al-
ways he has manifested much affection and gratitude for our govern-
ment...."23 This reply did little to restore Nava's shaken confidence in
the American, and in June of 1799 he ordered the horse trader arrested.24
Nolan, oowever, had already returned to the United States.
The following year, disregarding warnings not to enter Texas, Nolan
and a party of men again entered the province. In March of 1801 they
were surrounded north of present Waco by a force of 150 Spanish soldiers.
In the ensuing struggle Nolan was killed and the remainder of his party
captured.25 As a result of this affair, Spanish suspicions about the de-
signs of the United States grew.
Another factor contributing to the mounting Spanish distrust of the
Anglo-Americans was the purchase of Louisiana in 1803-an incident that
almost led to war between the two nations three years later. The transfer
of control of this province to the United States, effected on December 15,
1803,26 immediately raised two problems: what should be done about the
large number of Louisianans who wished to migrate to Texas, and exactly
where was the boundary between the two provinces?
Governor Juan Bautista de Elguezabal27 of Texas, who had succeeded
Munoz, desired to populate the province under his command, and freely
granted licenses to immigrants. But the new commandant-general Nemesio
Salcedo y Salcedo,28 did ,not agree. On January 9, 1804, he wrote the
governor of Texas that no individual proceeding from Louisiana was to
be allowed to settle in the Eastern Interior Provinces. They could move
to New Spain, but only to the interior.29 Two months later, however, Sal-
cedo's order was countermanded by a royal decree approving the resettle-
ment of Louisianans in the Interior Provinces. The only proviso was that
they could not live at Nacogdoches because they might be tempted to smug-
gle.30 After the arrival of the king's order, the influx of settlers to Texas
90 East Texas Hiswrical Journal
from the neighboring territory doubled and redoubled, ending only with
the Neutral Ground settlement of 1806.31
A greater problem for the Spaniards than the peaceful settlers was
the deserters from the United States Army and the fugitive slaves who
made their way to Texas and asked for asylum.32 The Spaniards feared
that the deserters were spies, and the owners of the runaway slaves pro-
tested loudly. The commandant-general finally issued an order that any
deserter about whom there was the slightest suspicion was to be returned
immediately to the American authorities; the rest were to be removed
as far west as San Antonio, as were all slaves.33
The other problem raised by the Louisiana Purchase-the exact boun-
dary-was an old one. The American government had merely inherited a
dispute that dated back to the years preceding 1763, when Spain had ac-
quired Louisiana from France and rendered the question academic. Many
Americans believed that the Louisiana Purchase included Texas, and
began noisily asserting a claim to it.54 The Spaniards not only resisted
mch demands, but asserted a counterclaim. In Madrid the Council of
State in March of 1804 delineated the boundary as Spain felt it to be: from
the Gulf of Mexico up the Arroyo Hondo to the vicinity of Natchitoches,
and up the Red River. The boundary in the north, the Council asserted,
was the Missouri River.55
Local Spanish officials disagreed about the exact boundary. The Mar-
quis de Casa-Calvo, Spanish consul in New Orleans, believed the Sabine
was the dividing line. Governor Elguezabal thought the line should be
drawn according to the boundary set in the treaty of 1800 which returned
Louisiana to France. Commandant-General Salcedo said nothing at all; in-
stead, he sent a detachment of troops to occupy a position at Bayupier
(Bayou Pierre) near the abandoned Spanish presidio of Los Adaes. He
further ordered that no Americans whatsoever be allowed to approach the
area to survey a boundary until the royal government designated a com-
mission for that purpose.36
Gradually Salcedo began shifting his troops in the Eastern Interior
Provinces in order to be able to cope quickly with any emergency along
the Texas-Louisiana boundary. By September of 1805 the number of sol-
diers in Texas had been increased from two hundred to five hundred and
fifty. Governor Antonio Cordera y Bustamante,37 new chief executive in
the province, still was dissatisfied; he asked for an additional seven hun-
dred men.35 The commandant-general did the best he could under the
circumstances, and by December 31 of that year there were seven hundred
troops in Texas, 141 of them at Na.cogdoches and its vicinity.39
Early in 1806 the boundary dispute began to boil in earnest. The
mayor of Natchitoches, the American outpost nearest Texas, wrote the
commandant at Nacogdoches, Captain Sebastian Rodriguez, asking an as-
surance "that there will be no more incursions or acts of violence com-
mitted by subjects of Spain on this side of the Sabine River, which is con-
;,idered included in the territory of the United States." Furthermore, he
requested that all Spanish troops east of the Sabine be removed.40 Rodri-
guez replied that the Spaniards occupied their "own territory," and that
..
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patrols would continue to be sent as far east as the Arroyo Hondo until
he received further orders from the commandant-general.41 Rodriguez at
first seemed ready to back his bold words with action. On February 2
word reached Nacogdoches that a large party of American private citizens
intended to occupy the area in dispute. The captain issued a proclama-
tion to Spaniards in East Texas calling upon them to fight:
The time has arrived in which you should that you are vassals of
His Catholic Majesty. I want you to know that the United States,
full of ambition and greed, intends to usurp from our sovereign
. . • part of this province. . . . It has been intimated to me by the
commandant of the American troops that if we do not evacuate
the terrain [between the Arroyo Hondo and the Sabine] ... they
will take that unjust pretext to declare war on us. I have given
orders to our troops not to abandon their posts except at the price
of their lives•... And I believe that you, on your part, should do
as much in defense of the country in which you have your families,
your property, and your subsistence, those whose station permits
it taking arms. In this way you will show your fidelity and pa-
triotism.42
Just three days after this pronouncement, the Spanish troops east of
the Sabine had a chance to demonstrate their bravery. Approximately
150 American private citizens, without official sanction, approached the
Spanish outposts in the disputed territory, and the Spaniards withdrew
without a fight.43 Captain Rodriguez decided that war was imminent, that
the Spaniards could not win, and that it would be bad for his career to
command a losing engagement. He asked to be replaced, declaring that
the situation was "critical" and that his troops and their horses were
"exhausted."44
The commandant-general saw the explosive possibilities of the contro-
versy with the United States and the need of a seasoned officer in the area.
He sent Lieutenant Colonel Simon de Herrera, Governor of Nuevo San-
tander, to East Texas to take command of the military forces along the
border. Herrera did not arrive at Nacogdoches until June,45 by which time
war seemed inevitable. He found that the American force at Natchi-
toches was estimated at 12,000 to 15,000 men. According to the rumors
circulating, this force was going to overrun the disputed territory and also
take North Texas, then force this settlement on Spain by presenting an
accomplished fact.46 Hastily the Spaniards moved the militias of Nuevo
Santander and Nuevo Leon, as well as regular troops from other areas,
to East Texas. By June 1 a record high of 1,368 Spanish fighting men
were gathered in Texas, of whom 883 were at Nacogdoches and its vicin-
ity.47
High Spanish officials moved cautiously. From the king came orders
to proceed carefully, but not to concede any of the disputed territory. Both
the viceroy and the commandant-general echoed this feeling. Salcedo wrote
Herrera: "Do not begin the action or attack the Americans without an
absolute certainty of evicting them. . . ."48
At the very instant that it seemed war would begin, Herrera and Gen-
eral James Wilkinson, the American commander in Louisiana, reached a
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dramatic settlement~ Wilkinson proposed a compromise, Herrera agreed,
and on November 4 they signed an accord· providing that Spanish troops
would withdraw west of the Sabine, American troops would withdraw east
of the Arroyo Hondo, and a final settlement would be left to negotiation
between the two governments.49 Later, Herrera l'eceived the thanks and
praise of both the viceroy and the commandant-general for the compro-
mise-an act that amounted to disobedience of orders.50
Following this settlement, tensions gradually relaxed in East Texas, and
the number of Spanish soldiers in the area was reduced. Not all points
of contention between the United States and Spain were solved by the
Wilkinson-Herrera agreement, however. Fugitive slaves continued to make
their way to Texas, and their owners continued to demand their return.
Deserters from the United States Army continued to reach Nacogdoches
and ask for Spanish citizenship. And forbidden books, spreading what
Commandant-General Salcedo termed the "depraved ... maxims of liberty
and disunion," continued to be introduced into the New World Spanish
colonies.51
To offset the possibility of further American expansion, Spanish offi-
cials in the Eastern Interior Provinces made attempts between 1806 and
1808 to increase the population of Texas by establishing new towns and by
sending immigrants from Mexico. Between San Antonio and Nacogdoches
at the Trinity River, the settlement of Trinidad de Salcedo was founded
during the last week in December of 1805. Five families from San An-
tonio were joined there by a detachment of soldiers and twenty-three for-
mer Louisianans. Gradually the little village grew, until by March of
1809 it had a population of ninety-two.52 Also established was the smaller
settlement of San Marcos de Neve at the spot where the road between
San Antonio and San Juan Bautista (on the Rio Grande) crossed the San
Marcos River. Financed personally by Governor Cordero, this village
drew its settlers from Mexico. The founding date was January 6, 1808.
Four months later the population numbered sixty-one, including a detach-
ment of soldiers sent to guard the civilians from the Indian raiders. 53
Two final incidents disturbed the slumber of Spanish officials in the
Eastern Interior Provinces during the last years before the storm of revo-
lution broke in New Spain: the appearance of Lieutenant Zebulon Pike,
and the American Embargo Act. Most Spanish officials, including Com-
mandant-General Salcedo, believed that the Pike Expedition was part of a
continuing American plot to acquire territory that belonged to Spain. Sal-
cedo felt that Pike's specific purpose was to subvert the loyalty of the
Plains Indians. Therefore, as a counter measure, the commandant-general
in 1808 ordered an expedition to march from San Antonio to Santa Fe,
giving medals and flags to the various chiefs and exhorting them to retain
their allegiance to Spain. Pike's expedition had consisted of himself, a
doctor, and seven soldiers; the Spanish expedition was made up of two
hundred soldiers. Furthermore, Salcedo took steps to stop the illegal im-
migration of American settlers to Texas, giving specific orders to the
governor of the province to arrest such intruders. Governor Cordero
ageed with his superior; in October of 1808 he wrote: "We must assume
. .'. that the inundation of vagrants, who have been introducing them-
selves'into the area[bf North Texas] is nothingmol'e than a plot by that
realize, in suc-
....
...
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government [the United States] to take the land, and
cession, their ideas of conquest."54
The second cause of contention during the last years before revolution
developed in the Interior Provinces, and in all of the Spanish New World
colonies, was the American Embargo Act. Because of the disturbances in
Europe, the Spaniards had been purchasing in the United States the goods
which they annually distributed to the Indians as presents. Spanish offi-
cials saw the embargo as an insidious American plot to win away the al-
legiance of the Indian tribes in Texas and perhaps to cause uprisings and
raids by disgruntled natives in the Interior Provinces.55
Besides the problems with the United States, the representatives of the
king in the Interior Provinces were further disturbed by events in Europe.
In 1808 Spain again did a turnabout in the involved Napoleonic Wars, de-
claring a war on France and allying itself with England following the
forced abdication of Ferdinand VII. Salcedo and his fellow officers feared
that representatives of the new French regime in Spain might attempt to
take control of the colonies. The commandant-general ordered a careful
inventory of all weapons held by the inhabitants of Texas, and he filled
the officer ranks in the army to full complement.56 And he ordered that
any Spaniard or Frenchman who presented himself in the Interior Prov-
inces claiming to be a representative of the French regime in Spain was
to be arrested immediately; he declared that such individuals were "trai-
tors" to the "beloved king" and religion of SpainY
In San Antonio two councils were held in connection with the new
Cl'lSIS. Convened by Brigadier Bernardo Bonavia, Salcedo's second-in-
command, these councils were attended by Cordero, Henera, and the new
governor of Texas, Manuel de Salcedo. These gatherings were the last
displays of pomp and ceremony in the province while Spain ruled it. Bona-
via was met outside San Antonio by a military reception. Three days later,
April 17, 1809, the first council convened to discuss military affairs in the
Eastern Interior Provinces, and specifically the needs of Texas. The usual
recommendations followed: more troops were needed, Nacogdoches should be
garrisoned more strongly, and immigrants should be brought to populate
the area between the Sabine River and San Antonio.60
Commandant-General Salcedo proved cold to these proposals, however.
He was distrustful of foreigners and therefore was against the coloniza-
tion scheme. Furthermore, he believed that in defending Texas all avail-
able strength should be concentrated at San Antonio, not at Nacogdoches.
He had previously ordered that the road between San Antonio and Nacog-
doches deliberately be left in a state of disrepair in order to slow an in-
vading army.61
The second council was held in July of 1809 and discussed ways to im-
prove the economy ;in Texas. The major recommendation of this meeting
was that La Bahia be declared a port in order to facilitate the importation
and exportation of goods.62 But again the commandant-general turned a
deaf ear. He declared that it was "very remote" that La Bahia could be
opened successfully as a port.63
The two councils at San Antonio represented the lasfchance for the
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Spaniards to rejuvenate the economy of Texas and to institute reforms
that would benefit the entire Eastern Interior Provinces. However, the
same fear and distrust of change that made these officials resist the French
ideas of equality and the American idea of frontier democracy also caused
them to resist altering the status quo in the provinces under their com-
mand. Thus as the year 1810 dawned the soil was prepared for revolu-
tion, which in turn would further weaken and depopulate the provinces
and lay them open to filibusterers.
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